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Price Regulation, Market Exit, and 
Financial Leverage of Canadian 
Property-Liability Insurers 
Abstract: 
This paper investigates strategic brinksmanship between regulated property-liability insurance 
firms and their regulators. Prior research suggests that firms increase their financial leverage, 
and thus their probability of bankruptcy and expected bankruptcy costs, in order to mitigate 
the severity of binding price ceilings. Although financial leverage can be altered by changing 
capital structure, it can also be altered by increasing other liabilities, as analyzed in this paper. 
This paper uses an instrumental variable for price regulation with a maximum-likelihood 
Heckman estimation method over panel data for Canadian property-liability insurers to extract 
the impact that price regulation has on the financial leverage of insurers as well as the 
probability of bankruptcy, the non-selection probability. 
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Introduction 
According to Modigliani and Miller (1958), the market value of any firm is based on 
its productive capacity and not its capital structure. Several studies, however, suggest how 
regulated firms can alter their capital structure to increase their probability of bankruptcy and 
improve their bargaining position with the regulator.2 With an increased probability of 
bankruptcy, the regulator cannot cut prices as much as it otherwise might have.3 If this theory 
is true, firms may alter their capital structure in order to thwart the intentions of a regulator. 
Empirical research has demonstrated that firms do increase their financial leverage when they 
are faced with price regulation of their product.4  
Klein, Phillips, and Shiu (2002) use US property-liability insurer cross-sectional data 
and find that insurers subject to more stringent price regulation have higher financial leverage 
ratios. Klein et al. use an instrumental variable for the stringency of price regulation that is 
replicated in this paper. This paper extends the work of Klein et al. by using panel data and a 
maximum likelihood Heckman estimation method that allows the impact of price regulation 
on both the financial leverage and the probability of non-selection (probability of bankruptcy) 
to be estimated jointly. This paper finds similar results to Klein et al. but does not consider the 
worker’s compensation markets in Canada as they are provincially monopolized; only price 
regulation of the automobile insurance market is considered.5 The automobile insurance 
market is serviced by property-liability insurers.6 
Modigliani and Miller (1958) found that the value of a firm is independent of its 
capital structure; a firm can fund its activities by using any combination of debt and equity 
without changing the underlying productive value of the firm. The probability of bankruptcy 
for a firm, however, generally increases with more financial leverage as the debt usually 
requires fixed repayments and most firms have earnings which are not fixed, but volatile. As 
financial leverage increases and the fixed debt repayments increase, the probability that the 
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 Spiegel and Spulber (1994), Dasgupta and Nanda (1993), Taggart (1981) 
3
 Dasgupta and Nanda (1993) 
4
 Klein, Phillips, and Shiu (2002), Hagerman and Ratchford (1978), Taggart (1985), and Dasgupta and Nanda 
(1993). 
5
 Note that although the worker’s compensation market has been excluded from observation because it is 
completely monopolized, the automobile insurance markets in Canada have not been excluded as they are not 
completely monopolized, even in the provinces of British Columbia, Saskatchewan, and Manitoba. In those 
provinces, competitive insurers can still compete with the crown corporations in the non-monopolized section of 
the market. The automobile insurance market segments monopolized by the crown corporations are the 
minimum, mandatory coverages, while the optional, extended coverages are not monopolized. Optional, 
extended coverages include higher third-party liability limits and lower deductibles. 
6
 Property-liability insurance companies, also known as property-casualty companies are companies that do not 
write life insurance, living health benefits, or health insurance. Property-liability insurers insure property and 
provide coverage to individuals, businesses and other organizations for liability exposure. Typical property-
liability insurance policies include personal automobile, personal home, apartment, condominium, commercial 
automobile, commercial business, motor-homes, personal property, cottages, personal-liability umbrella, etc.  
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firm will not have sufficient earnings to pay the debt payments in a given time period 
increases.7 In Canada, a failure to meet liabilities as they become due is an act of bankruptcy 
upon which creditors can seize the assets of the company in order to recover their 
investment.8 This paper assumes that the process of bankruptcy itself is costly.9 As the 
probability of bankruptcy increases, the expected bankruptcy cost increases.  
 Assuming that the debt holders of an insolvent firm restructure the firm and re-enter 
the market, it could be months before the restructuring process is complete.10 It is assumed in 
this paper that the regulator places a high value on keeping its regulated firms solvent. The 
regulator must ensure that the participation-constraint11 of the insurer is met and does so by 
allowing a price which allows the firm to make non-negative profit.12 Following Spiegel and 
Spulber (1994), the regulator maximizes a utilitarian welfare function given by 
 ( , , ) ( ) ( , , )W p k D CS p b p k D= + Π  (1) 
 Note however that in Canada, property-liability insurance companies are restricted in 
their ability to choose their own capital structure. In Canada, property-liability insurers are not 
allowed to have any more than two percent of their capital from debt obligations.13 Ignoring 
the debt obligations of the company, the utilitarian welfare function can then be written as  
 ( , ) ( ) ( , )W p k CS p b p k= + Π  (2) 
where ( ) ( )
p
CS p Q p dp∞= ∫  is consumer surplus and b is a weight on profits which generally is 
assumed to satisfy 0 1b< < . The profit function is assumed to be normally behaved, 
increasing in p. The price that the regulator chooses, as a function of capital *( )p k , 
corresponds to an allowed rate of return ( *( ), ) /p k k kΠ . 
 Although the Spiegel and Spulber (1994) paper does not consider the possibility of 
increasing the probability of bankruptcy by means other than an increase in debt obligations, 
this paper considers it. Although the regulated property-liability insurer in Canada is restricted 
                                                          
7
 Assuming the volatility of earnings increases or stays constant. 
8
 Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act, S.C.1992 s.42(1), as amended by S.C. 1997 c.12 s.26, 2004, c. 25, s. 27 
9
 Klein et al. (2002), Dasgupta and Nanda (1993), Spiegel and Spulber (1994), Taggart (1981), Spiegel (1994), 
Brander and Lewis (1988), Taggart (1985), Choi et al. (2002) also assume this. 
10
 Willes and Willes, 2001, ‘Contemporary Canadian Business Law, Principles and Cases, Sixth Edition,’ p.579-
584 
11
 The participation constraint is a non-negative profit condition, not a zero profit condition. 
12
 Owen and Braeutigam (1978) say that “One of the worst fears of a regulatory agency is the bankruptcy of the 
firm it supervises.”  Referenced in Taggart (1981), p.388-9 
13
 Insurance Companies Act, Section 476; Property and Casualty Companies Borrowing Regulations, Section 7. 
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in the level of debt that can be issued, it can increase its probability of bankruptcy by 
increasing its other liabilities including unpaid claims, unpaid premiums, general accounts 
payable, and other liabilities in it’s financial accounts. By increasing liabilities in general, the 
insurer increases its probability of bankruptcy.  
 Without price regulation, the insurer would choose an optimal level of liabilities such 
that the opportunity cost of capital is equal to the negative of the decrease in the expected 
profits because of the increase in the probability of bankruptcy from having higher liabilities. 
With the introduction of price regulation, the insurer has a new incentive, the incentive to 
increase the probability of bankruptcy above this equilibrium level so that the regulator who 
places a sufficiently-high value on the solvency of insurers does not cut prices so much that 
the probability of bankruptcy exceeds some probability of insolvency rate that is acceptable to 
the regulator.  
 With the expectation on the part of the insurer that the regulator will not cut prices so 
much that the probability of insolvency exceeds some acceptable level, the stage is set for a 
two stage bargaining game in which sub-game perfect equilibrium can be used as the solution 
concept for determining the optimal liability level of the insurer in order to maximize profits.  
 In the first stage of the game, the price regulated insurer chooses the level of financial 
leverage. In the second stage of the game, the regulator sets the regulated price so as to 
maximize the utilitarian welfare function. Using sub-game perfect equilibrium as the solution 
concept, the regulator sets prices such that the insurers remain solvent . In the first stage of the 
game, the insurer chooses leverage in order to maximize profits. Note that the expected profit 
function contains the expected bankruptcy costs. 
Literature Review 
 Klein, Phillips, and Shiu (2002) investigate whether price regulation impacts the 
capital structure of property-liability insurers in the US and find evidence consistent with the 
theory of Spiegel and Spulber (1994). Klein et al. use an instrumental variable for the 
stringency of regulation and another for the extent of regulation.14 Klein et al. did not estimate 
the degree to which financial leverage impacts the probability of insolvency.  
 Klein et al. (2002) use the size of the residual automobile insurance markets in each 
state and the size of the residual worker’s compensation insurance markets in each state, 
weighted by an insurer’s exposure to that market segment, as an instrumental variable for the 
stringency of price regulation.  
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 Klein et al. (2002) p. 84, s.4.2. The stringency variable is replicated in this paper. 
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The residual market in each US state/ Canadian province or territory/ business line is 
the market of last-resort for consumers who cannot find insurance coverage in the regular 
market. Ceteris paribus, as price regulation becomes more stringent, more automobile 
insureds will be placed into the residual markets given the desire by insurers not to insure 
consumers at a price which is sufficiently low. 15 
 Hagerman and Ratchford (1978) investigate the impact that economic and political 
variables have on the allowed rate-of-return for electric utility companies. Using data from 
seventy-nine US electric utility companies in thirty-three states, Hagerman and Ratchford find 
that the financial leverage of electric utility companies (measured by debt/ equity) has a 
significant and positive impact on the allowed rate-of-return. Klein et al. (2002) and Spiegel 
and Spulber (1994) argue that price control regulation causes firms to increase their financial 
leverage and that the increased financial leverage causes regulators not to lower the regulated 
price as much as they otherwise could have. Klein et al. find evidence of the first half of that 
argument, that price regulation causes insurers to increase their financial leverage. Hagerman 
and Ratchford (1978) find evidence for the second half of that argument, that financial 
leverage ratios which are high result in higher allowed rates-of-return (through higher prices) 
from the regulator for the regulated firm. 
Taggart (1981) argued that rate-of-return regulation can create incentives for firms to 
alter their capital structure. Taggart (1985) found evidence that rate regulation impacts the 
financing decisions of utility companies. He found that “the establishment of regulation is 
associated with a discernible increase in utility debt proportions.” However, Taggart could not 
rule out the possibility that the debt increased as a result of decreased business risk. If a 
regulated firm is more stable than an unregulated firm owing to some governmental protection 
and/ or guarantee to earn some pre-determined rate, it is plausible that a firm might use more 
leverage as the increased leverage/ bankruptcy risk may be offset by the decreased business/ 
competitive risk. In the case of property-liability insurance, most states and provinces have 
multiple companies operating, suggesting that there is not any lowered business or 
competition risk because of price regulation and regulation in general. However, the strategic 
bargaining game outlined by Spiegel and Spulber (1994) requires that the regulator values the 
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 Whether a provincial regulator has an “all-comers-rule” or not is not the key; the key is the existence or non-
existence or degree of price regulation. An “all-comer’s rule” is a rule which requires all insurers to provide 
insurance to any and all consumers who the insurer may not wish to insure at a binding price-control-ceiling rate. 
The risk-sharing-pools enable insurers who are subject to an “all-comers-rule” to pool their risks so that they all 
receive the same loss from that group of policies. In the absence of an “all-comers-rule,” the risk-sharing-pools 
still exist when the regulator allows higher-risk consumers to get automobile insurance through carrier-insurers 
(insurers who write on-behalf of the pool). In that situation, the carrier-insurers write on behalf of the pool and 
the overall loss is then apportioned in some manner to either the government or all of the insurers themselves. 
Whether the government subsidizes those high-risk consumers or the insurers subsidize them themselves is 
unimportant as the instrumental variable for the stringency of price regulation is the size of the risk sharing 
market/ pool(s) for the province in the given year, not who subsidizes them.  
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firm’s solvency; if there are multiple competitors, the regulator may allow some insurers to go 
bankrupt as others will presumably service the market share the bankrupt firm leaves behind. 
 Dasgupta and Nanda (1993) find evidence that regulated US electric utilities 
companies in the period 1972-1983 increased their financial leverage when they were subject 
to more hostile regulatory environments. Dasgupta and Nanda argue that firms increase their 
debt in order to increase their bargaining power with the regulator. 
As already discussed, Spiegel and Spulber (1994) argue that a firm’s capital structure 
has a significant effect on the regulated price that the firm receives. Spiegel and Spulber find 
that firms increase their financial leverage because of price regulation.  Furthermore, Spiegel 
(1994) argues that the regulated price is an increasing function of a firm’s debt. Spiegel also 
argues that when regulators attempt to limit the ability of a firm to raise capital, the firm may 
reduce overall investment which can actually harm consumers. Whether a regulated firm 
increases overall investment or not is not directly considered in the current paper.  
While there appears to be agreement across the previous non-insurance market studies 
that regulated firms are more financially leveraged than unregulated firms, the study by Klein 
et al. did not estimate the impact of price regulation on the probability of insolvency. Further, 
the use of the panel data set in this paper allows fixed-effects to be held constant at the firm 
level, producing more efficient estimators of the impact of price regulation on the financial 
leverage of insurers.  
Methodology  
The official regulatory financial definitions of surplus and equity differ from Canada 
to the USA and from Klein, Phillips, and Shiu (2002) to this paper. The Office of the 
Superintendent of Financial Institution’s (Canada’s federal-government agency solvency 
regulator for insurance companies) definition of surplus changed in 2003 — the data point 
was not consistent over the time-period analyzed.16 For that reason, the data source utilized in 
this paper (MSA Research Inc.) did not have the surplus variable available past the year 2003. 
Instead of using surplus, this paper has used equity to calculate the main financial leverage 
ratios.17 
Klein et al. (2002) claim that their analysis using cross sectional data helps them 
overcome possible confounding effects that can be caused when other regulations are 
                                                          
16
 According to MSA Research Inc., “statutory surplus” was defined as: [Assets- Liabilities- Reserves required] 
prior to 2003 when it was discontinued and replaced with “adjusted equity” defined as: [Total Equity - Capital 
Required for Catastrophes and Reinsurance Ceded to Unregistered Insurers.] 
17
 The differences between surplus and equity are not expected to alter the results. Prior to 2003, surplus was 
defined as [assets-liabilities-reserves required], and so it represented excess equity that the firm had. In the main 
analyses in this paper, equity is used instead of surplus.  
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introduced at the same time as price regulation.18 The instrumental variable for price 
regulation employed by Klein et al. and in this paper is an efficient estimator. It is more 
efficient than the actual observed price chosen by the regulator because it varies with changes 
in the cost of the insurance product itself. Whereas the actual observed price chosen by the 
regulator does not necessarily change with changes in the cost of the product, the instrumental 
variable does. The cost of the insurance product is determined, in part, by the evolution of tort 
law and changes in the cost of fixing vehicles. The instrumental variable is efficient because 
an increase in the cost of the product will force more consumers into the residual market, an 
effect that would not be captured by using only the regulated price observed. Furthermore, the 
regulated price suffers from endogeneity issues as the regulator sets prices in order to lower 
financial leverage and the probability of insolvency. The instrumental variable, although it 
may also suffer from the same endogeneity issue, would be more efficient than the regulated 
price variable since the tort system and the cost of fixing vehicles is exogenous to the 
insurer’s choice of financial leverage. 
Data 
 The main source of data for this analysis comes from MSA Research Inc., a private 
Canadian company engaged in collecting, organizing, and selling data from the Canadian 
insurance industry. The data set is similar to that used by Klein et al. (2002).19 MSA Research 
Inc. collects data both indirectly and directly from insurance companies.20 This data set was 
chosen because it is the most comprehensive source for Canadian property-liability insurance 
company financial information.21 The data from MSA Research Inc. was supplemented with 
data from the Facility Association that provided information on the size of the residual 
insurance markets and risk-sharing-pools in every province for every year of observation.22 
                                                          
18
 Klein et al. (2002), p.80. For example, other changes (minor-injury benefit ceiling, two new risk-sharing pools 
on top of the already existent residual market pool) were introduced in 2003 and 2004 to the Alberta personal 
automobile insurance market in addition to price regulation. The effects of other changes in regulation alongside 
price regulation are discussed in the data section on page 20. 
19
 In Klein et al. (2002), the authors used data from both the automobile insurance industry and the worker’s 
compensation industry as they are the most heavily regulated insurance sectors in the US (Klein et al. (2002), 
pp.84, 85). In Canada, worker’s compensation insurance is monopolized by government at the provincial level 
and, as such, is not useful for the analysis of this paper. This paper investigates only the automobile insurance 
industry in Canada relative to the rest of the Canadian property-liability insurance industry. 
20
 See MSA Research Inc.’s website for more information, http://www.msaresearch.com/, accessed July 16, 
2007. 
21
 See MSA Research Inc.’s usage rates: http://www.msaresearch.com/products_msaresearcherPC.php  
22
 The residual/ risk-sharing-pool market data from the Facility Association was calculated by the Facility 
Association using the written count basis, not the written premium basis. 
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The Facility Association is an unincorporated Canadian body that administers the residual 
markets and risk-sharing-pools in Canada.23 
 Three-hundred fifteen (315) property-liability insurance companies operated in 
Canada during the years 1997-2006 inclusive. This includes all property-liability insurers in 
the MSA Research Inc. data set whether they sold automobile insurance or not. Some of the 
companies exited the industry during this time period and some entered after 1997, in addition 
to that, some companies may have become licensed one year (observed in the MSA Research 
Inc. data), but did not start operating until the next year or a later year. Given the hypothesis 
that price regulation causes an increase in financial leverage and bankruptcy, it would not be 
surprising to find that an insurer’s decision to be in the market or not is correlated with the 
degree of price regulation. A Heckman two-step estimation method is used to account for this 
problem.  
Of the 315 companies that operated in Canada in the ten year time period observed, 93 
entered after 1997, these companies were removed from the panel. After removing these 93 
companies, 222 companies remained. These 222 companies were in business in Canada 
selling property-liability insurance on or before 1997. Of these 222 companies, only 182 
survived until at least 2006. Therefore, the panel of 222 firms observed over ten years, 2220 
observations, includes 40 firms that exited the industry at some point during the period of 
observation. Of these 40 firms that exited, it is reasonable to assume that price regulation may 
have played a role in their decision to leave the industry. Using Heckman’s maximum 
likelihood estimation technique, it is possible to jointly solve for both the impact of price 
regulation on the financial leverage of insurers as well as the impact of price regulation on the 
probability of non-selection, that is, the probability of market exit/ insolvency. 
The Facility Association provided data on the size of the residual market in each 
province. The only provinces in which the Facility Association does not operate are British 
Columbia (BC), Saskatchewan (SK), Manitoba (MB), and Quebec (QC). It does not operate 
in BC, SK, or MB because each of those provinces has a crown-corporation monopoly that 
provides mandatory (monopolized) and optional insurance (competitive) to all drivers 
including higher-risk drivers which the Facility Association normally insures or underwrites 
in other provincial jurisdictions.24 In Quebec, there are no residual markets for higher-risk 
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 See: http://www.facilityassociation.com/, accessed July 16, 2007. 
24
 Crown corporations have not been excluded from the data set. Nevertheless, the results do not change in 
significance or magnitude when they are excluded. It is the belief of this author that crown corporations should 
be included in this fixed-effects analysis. The fixed-effects regression essentially assigns a dummy variable to 
each and every company including the crown corporations. In addition to this, the perfect competition 
assumption implies that the firms will all earn zero profit, a result which may not be too different from the crown 
corporation which may have a non-profit condition on it as well. It is important to remember that even the capital 
used by a monopolized crown corporation has an opportunity cost which the crown corporation must recover 
over time in order to maintain solvency without subsidization or a tax-payer bailout (even though it may be able 
to ignore the opportunity cost of it’s capital for an extended period of time).  
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drivers; if a driver cannot find insurance at a price he is willing to pay, he is not insured and 
cannot legally drive. In addition to the residual market pools, the Facility Association 
manages what are known as “risk-sharing-pools”. The residual market pools and the risk-
sharing-pools are essentially the same thing—a risk-sharing mechanism for the riskiest drivers 
to which all insurers participate.25 This paper assumes that the residual markets and the risk-
sharing-pools are the same. The residual markets and the risk-sharing-pools in each province 
have been added together, in this paper, for each year. 
Table 1. Summary Statistics for all variables, 1997-2006 
Variable Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Minimum Maximum 
      
Dependent Variables      
Total Liabilities to Equity 1820 1.964 1.908 -0.106 23.147 
Total Liabilities to Liquid Assets 1820 59.068 36.364 -17 641.4 
Unearned Premiums to Equity 1820 0.531 0.614 -0.626 3.971 
Unpaid Claims to Equity 1820 1.209 1.230 0 12.622 
Premiums / Equity 1820 0.955 3.922 -1.264 164.034 
      
Regulatory Variables      
Regulatory Stringency 2220 0.006 0.013 -0.082 0.127 
      
Control Variables      
ROA Before Taxes 1820 0.04 0.11 -1.897 1.369 
Year 2220 - - 1997 2006 
The negative values of various variables are a result of accounting procedures and are still valid for the analysis. 
  
Table 1 shows the summary statistics for all variables. Some of the minimum 
observations in the summary statistics table are negative. In the case of the financial leverage 
ratios, the negative minimum observations arose from only one company.26 The negative 
value from the one company comes from contra-liability accounts in their accounting-
                                                          
25
 In the case of the residual markets, the facility association essentially re-insures the consumer through a 
servicing insurance company. In the case of the risk-sharing-pool, insurance companies directly insure 
consumers and then report their qualifying policies to the Facility Association which then collects extra money 
or takes extra money from insurers depending on the performance of their pooled risks relative to the average 
pooled risk. 
26
 Legacy General Insurance Co. had negative liabilities in the years 1997 and 2003. Legacy’s negative values 
come from contra accounts. Other observations in the sample had negative unearned premiums also, but the net 
result (when considering all liabilities) for those were positive while for Legacy and Atrudius was negative. 
These observations have not been removed from the sample as they are still informative and accurate 
observations not containing any known errors. 
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recognition of earned premiums.27  The negative minimum value for the “sum of exposure to 
regulatory stringency” arose from companies that had negative automobile insurance 
premiums from select provinces in select years (total of 16 observations). 
 Five different definitions for leverage (dependent variables) are used for otherwise 
identical specifications. The most straightforward and comprehensive definition used is “total 
liabilities to equity.” Three of the other dependent variables simply analyze components of 
“total liabilities” relative to equity or assets to see which components the insurer altered to 
increase financial leverage.28 The fifth definition of financial leverage is one that is particular 
to the insurance industry itself, “premiums over equity”. “Premiums over equity” is a rough 
measure of an insurer’s capitalization relative to its premiums. If the ratio of premiums to 
equity is higher than it is for another company or for another year, it can be said that the 
insurer is likely more leveraged. This assumes that premiums are an accurate measurement of 
the total risk that the insurer has insured and that the amount of risk per premium collected 
does not vary from company to company. The higher the ratio of premiums to equity, the 
more premiums (and by assumption, risk) the insurer has relative to its ability to pay for 
losses, equity.  
 All provinces and territories with price control regulation in Canada have a residual 
market and/or risk-sharing-pool for the pooling (and subsidization) of risks for when the 
binding price control regulation is below the market price.29 
 Klein et al. (2002) use six different measurements for the stringency of regulation. 
Only one of the six variables from Klein et al. is directly replicated in this paper. 30  
                                                          
27
 A contra account is an accounting term for an account which offsets another account but is placed in the same 
section of the balance sheet (assets, liabilities, or shareholders equity) as the account it offsets.  
28
 Standard accounting definitions would have likely been used to determine which items the companies placed 
under assets, under liabilities, and under equity. In Canada, insurance companies must use Statutory Accounting 
Procedures (SAP) instead of Generally Accepted Accounting Procedures (GAAP). SAP is assumed by this 
author to be more rigorous and standardized than GAAP, contributing to standardized data points from one 
company to the next.  For the uninformed reader, the standard accounting equation is [assets=liabilities + 
equity]. For each one dollar in assets that a company has, it is matched by either one dollar in equity or one 
dollar in liabilities or some combination of the two to equal one dollar. 
29
 Another argument for the pooling of risks into residual markets and/ or risk sharing pools is that the highest 
risk consumers are too risky and that it is fairer to insurers if they all share in the losses for the highest-risk 
consumers. 
30
 The remaining four regulation variables used by Klein et al. were not available for Canada. Two were based 
on US-specific research from Conning and Company known as the External Climate Index. The remaining two 
regulatory variables used by Klein et al. were based on information from the US National Council on 
Compensation Insurance. Conning and Company has information for the US on the regulatory stringency of a 
regulator and bases its analysis, for example, on the size of the regulator’s budget to the total market size and the 
number of people on the regulator’s payroll to the size of the market. The information from the US National 
Council on Compensation Insurance is based, for example, on the ratio of the number of rate-increase 
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Equation (3) is the formula for the instrumental variable for the severity of price 
regulation on each observation— each i insurer in a given t year. The severity of regulatory 
stringency is an efficient instrumental variable; consider the alternative: the actual price 
controls introduced for each level of risk for each year for each province. In order to 
understand the severity of a price control, we need to know the market price of the product. In 
the case of automobile insurance, that task is very difficult since the product varies 
tremendously from province to province and year to year, with different tort, legal and 
regulatory regimes that are constantly evolving. Suppose, for example, that a price control is 
in place but that the tort system changed. With such a change, the severity of price regulation 
would also change, but it would be unnoticed if the variable for price severity was simply the 
price regulation itself. By using this instrument, equation (3), fluctuations in the severity of 
price regulation will be captured. Furthermore, it is also likely that using the price controls 
themselves would create an endogeneity issue in that the regulator could set prices after 
observing insurer’s financial leverages. For that reason as well, the instrumental variable, 
equation (3), is efficient because the tort system likely varies in response to greater societal 
issues relating to the law than just insurer’s financial positions. 
The instrument is calculated through the summation of an insurer’s automobile 
insurance premiums in a j province or territory (the three territories were combined into one) 
in a given year, AutomobilePremiumsijt , over total premiums from all lines of business for that 
year, TotalPremiumsit , multiplied by the relative size of the province’s residual market in 
that year, jtRSIZE . The Facility Association provided data on RSIZE jt , the size of each 
province’s residual market relative to the province’s total automobile insurance market size in 
each year. As the severity of price regulation increases, the RSIZE jt variable increases. As an 
insurer’s exposure to a province increases, the ratio of 
AutomobilePremiums
TotalPremiums
ijt
it
increases.  
 
11
1
AutomobilePremiums
RegStringency RSIZE
TotalPremiums
ijt
it jt
j it−
 
= × 
 
∑  (3) 
 
The harsher and more severe the price regulation (the farther it is below market prices) 
the higher the RegulatoryStringencyit  instrument will be. 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
applications that are accepted to the number of rate-increase applications made (by the insurance companies to 
the regulator). 
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The written-premium-method was used to calculate RSIZE jt . Only fourteen 
observations had negative stringency variables resulting from negative written premiums, this 
paper has assumed that this is not a problem.31 
The size of the residual market,
 
RSIZE jt , in each of the provinces of British 
Columbia, Saskatchewan, and Manitoba are zero—there are no residual markets or risk-
sharing-pools in these provinces. Insurers are free to offer insurance products in the non-
monopolized market segments of these provinces which are higher than the crown 
corporation’s prices. The crown corporations monopolize the mandatory insurance 
requirement in each province, but compete with other insurers for the optional automobile 
insurance coverage market segment. For example, in the province of Saskatchewan, the 
government requires all automobile drivers to carry minimum third-party liability insurance 
coverage of $200,000 and minimum collision and comprehensive coverage with a deductible 
of $700. The insurance customer does not have a choice as to which company he can buy this 
mandatory coverage from—he must buy it from the Saskatchewan Government Insurance 
company. However, if the customer would like to buy more insurance coverage, at his option, 
he can buy coverage for higher third-party liability insurance coverage up to $2,000,000 or 
even higher and he can buy an insurance product with a lower deductible, perhaps as low as 
$50 or $100. The optional portion of insurance coverage above-and-beyond the mandatory 
minimum coverages can be purchased from any insurance company, not just the 
Saskatchewan Government Insurance company, although they do sell it. The customer can 
buy the optional insurance coverage from any company that sells it and no company is forced 
to sell the optional insurance coverage for any certain price or below some regulated price. 
For this reason, the provinces of British Columbia, Saskatchewan, and Manitoba are assumed 
to have zero price regulation (on the competitive insurers for the optional insurance market) 
as the competitive insurers who offer products in these markets are not required to do so at a 
price-controlled rate. 
The variation in the price control variable may be caused by factors other than price 
regulation per se. Regulations that change the policy wording, claim benefits, and other costs 
in addition to the price can also impact the stringency of the regulation. If the product 
becomes more costly owing to a legislated increase in benefits and prices are restricted from 
reflecting the increased cost, the stringency of regulation will increase leading to an increased 
size of the residual market and the instrumental variable used in this paper.  
                                                          
31
 Negative written premiums can arise because consumers can start and stop their policies at any point in a 
calendar year, whereas the data from MSA Research Inc. used in this paper is based on the calendar year. The 
written premium method aggregates all premiums written in the calendar year whereas the earned premiums 
method accounts for all premiums actually earned in the year (irrespective of when the policy began/ ended/ was 
written).  
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 The profitability of an insurance company has been used as a control variable as it is 
assumed that an insurer’s profits vary over time and that this could affect financial leverage. 
The profitability of an insurer (relative to assets) varies from company to company and year to 
year. The variable used is: “return-on-assets before taxes and extraordinary items”. Insurers 
that have high profitability are assumed to have more retained earnings and, therefore, lower 
leverage. Insurers who are more profitable than others are also assumed to have higher growth 
opportunities and be more likely to hold on to capital in order to reduce the agency costs of 
acquiring external capital. It is expected that this variable be negatively correlated with 
leverage. It is assumed that this variable and the regulatory stringency variable are 
independent. While the panel data with fixed effects at the firm-level will account for most of 
the variation from one company to the next, the return-on-assets variable adds explanatory 
power to the model. Firms with similar profitability may have similar behavior, something not 
captured by the fixed-effects regression which essentially assigns a dummy variable to each 
firm over time. 
Empirical Analysis 
 With four-hundred censored observations, it is important that we correct the 
coefficient on the regulatory stringency variable to account for natural attrition that would 
have occurred in the absence of price regulation in Canada. The Heckman maximum 
likelihood method allows us to do this. Not only does the Heckman maximum likelihood 
method allow us to separate out the natural attrition rate from the attrition caused by price 
regulation, but the estimated probit on the probability of attrition caused by price regulation 
can be interpreted as a probability of bankruptcy measure. In this way, the theory of Spiegel 
and Spulber (1994) is brought to life: not only do we estimate the effect of price regulation on 
the financial leverage of insurers, but we also estimate the effect of price regulation on the 
probability of insolvency. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 2, Heckman Maximum Likelihood Estimation of Regulatory Stringency on the Financial Leverage of Canadian Property-Liability 
Insurers, fixed-effects at the firm level, panel data 1997-2006 inclusive, 1820 uncensored observations, 400 censored observations, 
standard errors have been clustered by firm, fixed effects omitted to save space. 
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 ML Model 1  ML Model 2  ML Model 3  ML Model 4  ML Model 5 
 
Total 
Liabilities to 
Equity select  
Liabilities 
to Liquid 
Assets select  
Unearned 
Premiums 
to Equity select  
Unpaid 
Claims to 
Equity select  
Total 
NPW/ 
Total 
Equity 
select 
RegStringency 28.95 60.862  87.107 59.838  8.972 67.281  18.145 53.758  -7.044 61.414 
 (4.53)*** (5.42)***  (1.71)* (4.25)***  (3.58)*** (6.60)***  (4.74)*** (4.27)***  (-0.67) (4.36)*** 
ROA Btax -0.966   -10.668   -0.208   -0.719   11.906  
 (-2.14)**   (-1.6)   (-2.67)***   (-2.02)**   (1.04)  
Yearline  -0.115   -0.208   -0.127   -0.101   -0.203 
  (-4.96)***   (-33.02)***   (-6.03)***   (-4.10)***   (-33.95)*** 
Constant 3.858 1.337  91.263 2.043  0.966 1.454  2.386 1.217  0.694 2.009 
 (53.02)*** (6.61)***  (186.58)**
* 
(46.74)***  (20.31)*** (8.46)***  (37.88)*** (5.70)***  (1.72) (49.68)*** 
Observations 2220 2220  2220 2220  2220 2220  2220 2220  2220 2220 
Robust z statistics in parentheses, * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
Yearline: (1997=1, 1998=2, … 2006=10) 
 
Table 2 shows the empirical results of the five different specifications using 
Heckman’s maximum likelihood method with fixed effects at the firm level and clustering for 
the standard errors.32 Model 1 is the primary specification and shows strong support for the 
hypothesis that firms subject to stringent price control regulation increase financial leverage. 
While Models 1 through 4 are significant, the leverage variable in Model 5 is not, suggesting 
that there are likely differences between the US and Canadian solvency regimes that have not 
been accounted for.33 
It is difficult to interpret the regulatory stringency variable, but it is informative to 
consider the effect that a one standard deviation increase in regulatory stringency has on the 
financial leverage of an insurer. From Table 1 we see that a one standard deviation in the 
regulatory stringency variable is 0.013; therefore, a one standard deviation increase in the 
stringency of regulation increases the probability of non-selection (insolvency/ exit from the 
industry) by 0.79 (79%). Furthermore, a one standard deviation increase in the severity of 
regulation increases the financial leverage of insurers by 0.3764; that is, a one standard 
deviation increase in the severity of price regulation increases the ratio of liabilities to equity 
by 38 cents for each dollar in equity. 
 
Also note that the Model 2 coefficient on regulatory stringency is higher than it is in 
Model 1, which is as it should be given that liquid liabilities can adjust faster than total 
liabilities, adding more support for the theory.  Also note that Models 3 and 4 show that one 
                                                          
32
 A Hausman test to compare the consistent fixed effects model with the more efficient random effects model 
returned a significant p-value confirming that the coefficients estimated by the random effects model were not 
the same as the ones estimated by the fixed effects model and confirming that the fixed effects model was 
required as the random effects model could not be used. 
33
 More work is needed on this. 
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of the ways in which insurers increase their leverage ratios is by increasing the ratio of 
unearned premiums to equity and unpaid claims to equity. After confirming that total equities 
has not decreased with the severity of regulation or with time, it is safe to say that insurers 
who are subject to stringent price regulation increase the time they take to pay claims and 
increase the amount of premiums they collect ahead of time, suggesting that they may be 
providing lower service as a reaction to more stringent price regulation.  
Conclusion  
This paper investigated the impact of price regulation on the financial leverage and 
probability of insolvency/ exit from the insurance industry by property-liability insurance 
firms. Heckman Maximum Likelihood and Heckman Two-Step estimations with fixed-effects 
at the firm level and instrumental variables for the severity of price regulation were used. The 
findings are qualitatively similar to previous US research done by Klein, Phillips and Shiu 
(2002), but the quantitative effects of price regulation on financial quality are more severe in 
this report using Canadian panel data. 
Regulators can unintentionally end-up lowering welfare by causing higher expected 
bankruptcy costs and lower profits which cannot be offset (owing to the increase in expected 
bankruptcy costs) by the increase in consumer surplus.34 
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